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Introduction
One of the more dramatic international legal developments of the last generation 
has been the conversion of the legal systems of most of the countries in Latin America  
from the inquisitorial model to the accusatorial model for the preparation and trial of 
both civil and criminal cases2  A trial in Latin America conducted under a loose 
interpretation of the inquisitorial or European model has traditionally been little more 
than an exercise in the reading of long affidavits by victims and witnesses, certifications 
of various police and other official records and a decision by the judge.  For the parties 
1Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law
2Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 167 (Fall, 1995); Tarigo, Legal Reform in Uruguay: General Code 
of Procedure, in Judicial Reform in Latin American and the Caribbean (Rowat, Malik, Dakolias, 
eds. the World Bank (1996); See generally Tiede, Lydia B. Committing to Justice: An Analysis of 
Criminal Law Reforms in Chile, eScholarship Repository, University of California.  
Http://repositories,cdlib.org/cilas/papers/224.  Pp. 7, fn.15; Jonathan L Hafetz, Pretrial 
Detention, Human Rights, and Judicial Reform in Latin America, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1754 
(2003).  See also U.S.AID reports.  Achievements in Building and Maintaining the Rule of Law: 
MSI’s Studies in LAC, E&E, AFR, and ANE Nov. 2002.  Occasional Papers Series.  Office of 
Democracy and Governance.  Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. 
Http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacr220.pdf.
Argentina adopted the accusatorial system for federal criminal procedure in 1989; Peru followed 
in codifications in both 1991 and 1994; Guatemala’s new code was enacted in 1994; El Salvador 
and Venezuela introduced the party system codes in 1998; Chile’s reform process spanned from 
1997 to 2000 and Costa Rica’s from 1996-1998; Bolivia and Paraguay were both in 1999;  
Ecuador was in 2000;  Honduras was in 2002; and Chile will conclude the reform process in 
2005.
2to give live testimony was a rare occurrence which, when it happened, would then be 
almost totally controlled by the judge.  The investigation and preparatory stage was 
equally dominated by the judge.3  The role of the lawyers for the parties at trial was 
confined almost exclusively to legal argumentation.4  The conversion to the accusatorial 
or so-called American party model has been effectuated by reform projects in a large 
number of countries, followed by statutory enactments, often of entirely new procedural 
codes.  This statutory reform establishes the new foundation to which the Latin lawyer 
must now adapt. What remains beyond that is for those lawyers to develop the 
necessary expertise in practice skills to implement that reform.  
The purpose of this article is to examine the reactions of Latin American litigators 
to some of the major differences in trial procedures between the inquisitorial model and 
the party model.  The context for the observations was a series of projects spanning a 
decade whose objective was to teach attorneys steeped in the inquisitorial to transition 
to the accusatorial.  During the course of the projects, the participants found that the 
procedural differences are substantial.  Certain of those differences gave the 
participants reason to pause and question the utility and efficacy of some of the 
accusatorial trial procedures which American litigators have long accepted as the 
correct way in which to proceed.  This article will review only those changes which 
caused the Latin lawyers the greatest degree of upset.  The challenge to the existing 
3See discussion, infra, of the official role of the public prosecutor during the pretrial 
phase of some national systems.
4Diehm, James W. The Introduction of Jury Trials and Adversarial Elements into the 
Former Soviet Union and Other Adversarial Countries. 11 J. Of Transactional Law and Policy 1, 
pp. 5-8.
3trial culture, as they understood it, combined with the sometimes difficult learning curve 
of the various American-model trial competencies, induced reluctance if not outright
rejection of aspects of the accusatorial model.
The focus of the article is on Latin America, first, because the author’s 
experience is centered in those countries but also because the wholesale abandonment 
of the inquisitorial model  in most of the countries of Central and South America 
represents a seismic shift in the international legal landscape which will have 
implications far beyond statutory reform.        
The first part of this article will review the author’s experience in teaching trial 
competencies to Latin lawyers through this series of both short and long term transition 
projects.  The second part will describe in very basic fashion the fundamental 
differences in the two models, so as to highlight the reasons for the difficulties 
encountered in teaching oral practice or oralidad.5  The third part will review those trial 
skills that were greeted by the Latin lawyers with reluctance, suspicion or outright 
criticism.  Finally, though it is very much too early to assess the success of the 
transition, several ideas for the future are offered to ease the process of change.
5Though the U.S. system has come to be used interchangeably with “the oral system,” 
American pleadings, briefs and memoranda in support of motions are invariably in writing.  The 
inquisitorial system, as least as adapted in Latin America, is referred to as the “written system,” 
not only because of the multiplicity of written pleadings and reports but also because there has 
traditionally been great emphasis on formality, with each stage of the process being reduced to 
writing and “sewn together” with other “writings” in the case. The judge then assumes the role of 
reviewing the often enormous quantity of writings and then of coming to conclusions based upon 
the written record. Some scholars suggest that the two models are distinguished not so much by 
the volume of the written record but by the fact that, under the party model, there is actually a 
hearing or series of hearings at which oral testimony is adduced. See Martha A. Field and 
William W. Fisher III, Legal Reform in Central America, Harvard (2001), p. 22,23.
4Background
For fifteen years, it has been the author’s privilege to train lawyers and judges 
from various parts of the world in a wide variety of lawyering skills.6 Lawyers and judges 
from Poland, Ukraine, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Macao, Palestine, Palestine, 
Spain, Italy and, in particular, much of Central and South America have participated 
with the author in projects designed to compare law or train non-American lawyers in 
various trial competencies.  Each program is custom-built, depending on the 
competency training sought or the focus of the grant under which the training was 
conducted. Substantive law programs have run the gamut from teaching the various 
international instruments relevant to practice, to doctrinal areas such as U.S. juvenile 
law, criminal law and procedure, the rules of evidence and, in the case of the 
Palestinian judges program, a judicial code of ethics. In addition, the author has 
escorted seven groups of law students to the Mexican state of Chiapas to work in local 
human rights legal offices, primarily on issues affecting the indigenous population.7
The focus here is on the teaching of trial advocacy, in particular, to lawyers from 
Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela.  In discussion 
with colleagues from other countries, particularly those European countries that are also 
6The author has a trial lawyer background and over twenty years experience in teaching 
evidence, litigation, trial skills, criminal law and procedure  at DePaul and other universities, as 
well as with the National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA) and several other agencies or 
judicial training programs.
7The leading human rights legal office in Chiapas is the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas 
Human Rights Center whose publications can be accessed at 
http://www.laneta.apc.org/cdhbcasas/Ingles.  Information about the DePaul College of Law 
program can be accessed at http://law.depaul.edu/programs.
5in the process of transition, such as Italy, it is clear that the concerns of the Latin 
lawyers were very similar to those of the Europeans, with cross-examination, plea-
bargaining, and the jury system provoking the greatest suspicion of the model. 
Most of the projects described focused on oralidad.  The projects11 emanated 
from a wide variety of funding sources, including U.S. Government agencies.  Project 
length would vary from one week to three months.  The number of participants would 
vary.  While it was uncommon to have a trial training project of more than 20 
participants, it sometimes happened that the sessions would be opened to a wider 
audience of students or professionals who, though not actually participating, were 
interested in the proceedings.  This was the case at almost all university-connected 
projects and also with the Judicial Council in Venezuela.
Under rubrics such as Human Rights, Rule of Law, or Sustainable Democracy 
development, various government, non-government and  international organizations 
and agencies developed action plans including private sector lawyers for projects 
ranging from judicial reform to court management to training skills programs.  These 
initiatives, and the oralidad training in particular,  from the United Nations,12 U.S. State 
11There were three primary funding sources for the projects.  The largest percentage of 
sponsorship came from agencies working with the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) on legal reform.  See  Margaret J. Sarles, “USAID’s Support of Justice 
Reform in Latin America,”pp. 47-69, in Rule of Law in Latin America: the International 
Promotion of Judicial Reform, Pilar Domingo and Rachel Sieder, eds. Institute of Latin 
American Studies, 2001.  Other projects were funded, through grantee organizations,  by the 
International Labor Organization, the Public Affairs Department of the U.S. Department of State, 
or by the Latin Universities and Consejos themselves.
12For example, the International Training Programme on the Criminal Justice System 
Reforms in Latin America (ILANUD).  See http://www.ilanud.or.cr/justiciapenal
6Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank13
and others  became standard components of literally hundreds of reform proposals 
offered to the private sector for implementation.14
Though the climate of distrust of the United States is today much stronger, there 
was, even then, substantial question among the participants as to whether the course 
content had been dictated or screened  by any U.S. government funder.  The question 
was also raised as to whether the participants themselves had been chosen by some 
unstated political criteria with an expectation that their future work would somehow 
serve U.S. interests.  These are impossible questions to answer without access to the 
internal deliberations of the agency in question.  It is, however, possible to state 
categorically that at no time was there ever any attempt or even suggestion to influence 
the content of the course, the content of the author’s teaching, or any other aspect of 
the author’s participation or perspective, political or otherwise.  As to the participants, it 
can only be stated with certainty, from this vantage point, that there was a wide variety 
of political perspectives within the various groups and that the discussions were 
completely politically uninhibited.  This is not to imply that one didn’t notice, from time to 
time, that a lawyer participant might defer or hesitate to confront a judge participant 
from the same country15 and that, as a result, the dynamic might not have been quite as 
13See generally, Webb, Legal and Institutional Reform Strategy and Implementation: A 
World Bank Perspective, 30 Law and Policy in International Business 161 (Winter 1999).
14For a description of the efforts of international organizations in the area of judicial 
reform, see Justice Delayed/Judicial Reform in Latin America (Jarquin and Carrillo, eds) John 
Hopkins University Press, 1998
15Most groups were composed either of lawyers or judges but, in at least one case, the 
participants were mixed.  Most of the lawyer groups were composed, in the criminal context, 
7robust as it might have been, but that is not a restraint placed upon the groups by the 
funders.  
USAID, as the largest funder of these and similar projects world-wide,  plays a 
diverse role internationally.16  While it may, in one locale, serve as the on-the-ground 
face of U.S. government policy, it may, in another location, operate to improve domestic 
systems, from the sewers and water filtration to the law schools and the legal system.  
In the case of Latin America, it seems clear that the impetus for  the various U.S. 
government programs in the Rule of Law area, is to develop a stable, predictable and 
overhauled legal system in target Latin countries.  From the perspective of U.S. foreign 
policy, perhaps those improvements will encourage U.S. multinationals to see the 
particular environment as safe or at least more predictable for  business in a developing 
“free trade” era.17 By the same token, that “democratization” or, better put, that 
reconfiguration of the courts to mirror U.S. practice, will, concomitantly, help the Latin 
lawyers to become better litigators in their own right and to do battle in their own courts 
more of public defenders than prosecutors.  Civil lawyers tend, in Latin America, to have a very 
general practice.
16Other projects focused on the widespread corruption and racketeering that is considered 
endemic to many of  legal systems.  Legal reform project packages, at least those of USAID, 
usually include technical assistance including curricular reform for the law schools, 
establishment of masters programs in the law schools, updating of physical plant, library 
materials and computer labs, upgrading of administrative support services.  For a description of 
the USAID action plan for Rule of Law in Guatemala, see Steven E. Hendrix, Restructuring 
Legal Education in Guatemala: A Model for Law School Reform in Latin America?, 54 
J.Legal.Educ. 597 (2004).
17See generally Garcia Gonzalez, Symposium: The Role of Legal Institutions in the 
Economic Development of the Americas, 30 Law and Policy in International Business 11 
(Winter 1999)
8on an even footing with all parties.  For lawyers who had never seen themselves as 
having any real control over the presentation and development of the investigation and 
trial, this change represents a true revolution in the potential for all lawyers to serve 
their own communities as legal advocates rather than, as has always been the case, to 
simply bow to the authorized stake-holders and weakly add collateral pieces of 
argument or evidence which the court may or may not even acknowledge or take into 
consideration.
 The author’s role was in the development of trial skills among the lawyers of the 
various Latin countries.  Though the transition  to oralidad posed the greatest 
challenge,  the transfer of power from the judge to the lawyers in the presentation of the 
case requires a very substantial retooling for judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and 
civil litigants.  The author’s personal motivation was to help see that those lawyers who 
previously had little access to the key decisions of the trial system could now litigate as 
lawyers trained to do battle in ways previously unknown–lawyers in control of the case, 
with the ability to conduct competent witness examinations, with the imagination to 
present a variety of forms of evidence, to make legal arguments based upon the facts 
as developed right there in the courtroom, with the ability to object to unreliable or 
inadmissible evidence, and unafraid to exercise the right to disagree with the trial judge.
These changes will eventually not only change the lives of their clients but will also 
change the entire legal culture of the country.
The Inquisitorial Model
The European and American trial systems are the products of two very different 
9procedural cultures.  The European system,0 itself experiencing major reform 
initiatives,20 has traditionally reduced the trial phase to a mere formality due primarily to 
the role of the judge.  In the investigatory phase, the judge of the investigation (the juge 
d’instruction in the French system, often cited as the quintessential example of an 
unreformed European model) is normally in charge of the investigation and collection of 
the evidence, with the goal of determining if a crime was committed and, if so, by 
whom.21  The judge is, in fact, expected to thoroughly pursue the investigation to its 
evidentiary conclusion before the case is turned over either to the public prosecutor or 
another judge to enter the trial phase.  The investigative  judge does so in closed 
proceedings, and without the benefit of counsel representing the parties.  If there is live 
testimony by a witness, it is usually before a clerk who writes the testimony down in the 
form of a statement and later presents it to the judge, without any cross-examination, 
along with the entirety of the investigative file.22  The proceedings are characterized as 
0
20See Linarelli and Herzog, Model Practices in Judicial Reform: A Report on Experiences 
Outside the Region, Justice Beyond our Borders, (Biebesheimer and Mejia, eds.) Johns Hopkins 
Press, 2000; see also U.S. AID reports, Achievements in Building and Maintaining the Rule of 
Law: MSI’s Studies in LAC, E&E, AFR, and ANE Nov. 2002.Occasional Papers Series.  Office of 
Democracy and Governance.  Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assoictance.  
Http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacr220.pdf. It 
should also be noted that the Austrian-German oral preliminary hearing reforms have served as a 
model, at least, to the Spanish in the reform of their civil code.  Some commentators feels that 
the Austrian-German model may be of greater utility than emulation of the U.S. model. See 
Fisher and Field III, note 5, p. 51. 
21Ennio Amodio, The Accusatorial System Lost and Regained: Reforming Criminal 
Procedure in Italy, 52 Am.J.Comparative Law, 489 (2004) (tracing the role of the juge 
d’instruction in the French system to its Italian analogue, the giudice istruttore).
22Marsha A. Field and William W. Fisher III, supra note 5, p. 22.
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“nonadversarial” because each of the participants in this phase is independent, whether 
they be appointed rapporteurs or judges.23
Because of the judge’s dominant role in the development of the case and the 
importance of the investigatory judge’s findings, the trial phase (primera instancia) 
became merely a confirmation of the findings of the investigation and, therefore, the 
principle of orality was of little utility.24 Should actual testimony be taken, it is normally 
the judge who would call the witness and conduct the examination whereas, in the 
adversarial system, any such active questioning by a judge is viewed as a challenge to 
the party attorneys and is looked at askance by courts of appeal.  
The criminal prosecutor, in the inquisitorial system, often is seen as an “official” 
of the state or the executive branch whose role is not to get a conviction but rather to 
seek the truth and to make conclusions independently from the judge.25  The 
prosecutor, in the inquisitorial model,  usually makes his/her initial appearance on the 
scene much earlier than any defense lawyer.  As a result, the criminal defense lawyer 
23
 This is not to imply that there is no conflict in the positions taken during the 
investigation.  Should a French citizen, for example, file a civil or criminal complaint, the court 
system, through the juge d’instruction and the rapporteur take over the case.  An independent 
commissioner of the government may provide the court with a separate and independent 
recommendation, as will the counsel for the parties.  The debate, however, is usually internal and 
in writing, though there is provision (sometimes seldom-invoked) in many European inquisitorial 
systems for the appointment of a jury.  Wright, Charles A. And Koch, charles H. Jr., Federal 
Practice & Procedure, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Ch.2, Sources of 
Administratiave Procedure Sec. 8124, Procedural Alternatives.  See also, Diehm, James W. , 
supra, not 4, p. 8
24Id. at p. 26
25For a full discussion of the role of the prosecutor, see Philip B. Heymann, Should Latin 
American Prosecutors be Independent of tjhe Executive in Prosecuting Government Abuses?, 26 
U.Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 535 (1995).
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and the client are seldom full participants in the process.  They arrive late to the 
proceedings and  their right to confront and present evidence exists only insofar as the 
judge chooses to pursue the right. Even under the new party model, many Latin 
American countries have opted to give the prosecution control of  the investigation 
phase, leaving defense counsel to protest at the door or exercise extraordinary initiative 
to embark on a defense investigation.26
Latin-American adaptations of the European model have been generally faithful 
to the most important elements of the Continental tradition.  To gain a basic 
understanding of the Latin trial procedural codes, it must also be understood that 
Constitutional rights in most Latin American countries have been codified along with the 
principal structural components of the legal system, including individual rights,  into the 
national Constitution.  Most countries separate powers into the executive, legislative, 
and judicial. Because funding for the judiciary usually depends upon the executive or 
the legislature and because appointment to the bench is often used as a political 
reward, the judiciary is usually the most compromised of the three branches, leading to 
a highly partisan administration of justice27 where political manipulation and 
administrative and budgetary neglect are endemic.28  The basic human rights included 
26Maximo Langer, From Legal Transpants to Legal Translations: the Globalization of 
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 1, 
27 (2004).
27Laura Nuzzi O’Shaughnessy and Michael Dodson, Political Bargaining and Democratic 
Transitions: A Comparison of Nicaragua and El Salvador, 31 Journal of Latin American Studies 
7, (1999).
28Dakolias, supra, note 2;  Buscaglia and Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of 
Corruption in the Judiciary, 30 Law and Policy in International Business 95 (Winter 1999); For 
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in the Constitutions include free speech, presumption of innocence, the right against 
self-incrimination, the right to counsel, prohibitions against lengthy detentions without 
trial, and due process.29 As in most systems, the gap between Constitutional theory and 
practice is substantial.
 Most of the Latin American legal systems are also code-based, with case 
precedent either non-existent or playing a distinctly collateral role in the process.30  That 
tradition is firmly entrenched and is not expected to change under the party model.  
This reality, of necessity, requires that new codes  be thorough, comprehensive and 
extremely well-drafted so as to include or at least contemplate every conceivable 
procedural problem.  Otherwise, there is little hope of uniform application of the laws or 
the procedure even within national boundaries.  In those countries with a large 
indigenous population,31 “customary” law will often conflict with national legislation, 
the Mexican example, see Yamin and Noriega Garcia, The Absence of the Rule of Law in 
Mexico: Diagnosis and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy, Loy.L.A.Int’l & 
Comp. L.J. 467 (1999).  See also Mendez, Juan E., “Institutional Reform, Including Access to 
Justice: Introduction,” p. 222, in The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America,
Mendez, Juan E., O’Donnell Guillermo, and Pinheiro, Paulo Sergio, eds., Notre Dame Press, 
1999.
29U.S.AID Reports: Achievements in Building and Maintaining the Rule of Law: MSI’s 
Studies in LAC, E&E,AFR, and ANE, Nov. 2002.  Occasional papers Series, Office of Democracy 
and Governance.  Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance.  
Http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacr220.pdf.; 
See also Steven E. Hendrix, Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Guatemala’s 
Conversion to the Adversarial System, 5 Sw.J.L. & Trade Am. 365 (1998).
30Diehm, supra, note 4, pp.8-9.  See also Martha Field and William Fisher III, supra, note 
5, p. 48.
31Commentaries on Raidza Torres, The rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging 
International Norm, 16 Yale J. Int’l. L. 127 (1991).  The universally-cited convention No. 169 of 
the International Labor Organization [cite] has been broadly ratified by Latin American states.  
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leading to a number of codifications of indigenous law.  Aside from the universally 
recognized Supreme Court, most of the countries, consistent with the European model, 
also have a Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional) which reviews matters of 
Consitutionality in actions against the federal government or even the Supreme Court.  
Other specialized courts such as Electoral Tribunals, Juvenile Courts, Military courts, or 
Courts of Human Rights may also exist.  
The inquisitorial model as adapted to the various Latin systems has retained the 
fundamental European characteristics but with a number of culturally or politically-
dictated modifications in each Latin-American national system.  Most importantly to the 
subject here, the process, before the transition, was shrouded in secrecy and was 
almost completely in writing.32 The judge’s investigative work, produced in what was 
called a sumario, often took years while a criminal defendant waited in jail or the civil 
parties went uncompensated. Just as there is little judicial oversight of the police, there 
has been traditionally even less oversight of the work of the judiciary.  In Mexico, for 
example, it is common for the Judge’s secretary to oversee case investigation and 
development, including the statement of the defendant, while judges themselves 
seldom appear.33  The role of counsel, even where the codes stipulate that counsel 
should be appointed, is minimal until well into the investigation phase and normally not 
Convention 169 sets forth guarantees of the collective rights of the indigenous, rights to their 
ancestral communal lands, cultural development, and economic and social development.  
32Tiede, Lydia B. Committing to Justice: An Analysis of Criminal Law Reforms in Chile, 
eScholarship Repository, University of California, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cilas/papers/224,
pp. 7, fn. 15.  See also Martha A. Field and William W. FisherIII, supra, note 5, p. 23.
33Special Report: Presumed Guilty? Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Mexico, 24 
Fordham Int’l. L.J. 801, 831 (2001).
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until the defendant, in the criminal case, has at least made a statement.34
It is undeniable that the judge, not the litigants, has been in charge during the 
preliminary and the trial stage.35  Only after the investigation did the attorneys for the 
parties take a more active role which, at that, was confined to written pleadings.36 The 
perception of arbitrariness, the insulation of the judicial elite, the “stultifying formalism” 
that “throws the facts of life out of court.”37 and the desire for legitimacy have fueled 
many of these changes toward the party system.
The Lawyers and Judges
The body of experience from which this article is drawn consists of over fifteen 
groups of lawyers and judges from Latin America whose participation in these projects 
was focused on learning the basics of trial advocacy skills.  The first group consisted of 
14 “human rights” lawyers, mostly from El Salvador, who spent three months in Chicago 
trying to learn the accusatorial or party system.  The “human rights” theme of the group 
was aspirational.  Most of the lawyers were either academics who were practicing law, 
along with several public defenders.  That project was followed by  seven programs for 
Guatemalan lawyers who,  over the next three years, came to DePaul for shorter but 
more intense trainings.  These groups consisted mainly of sitting judges,38 public 
34Id. at 844.
35In Guatemala, there was a fase intermedia, roughly equivalent to a probable cause phase 
which occurred between the investigation and the trial. That phase remains under the new law. 
See Hendrix, supra, note 29, p. 394.
36Id., pp. 10,11
37Mendez, supra, note 28, p. 222
38For an overview of the USAID judicial training programs in Latin America, see Linn 
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defenders, prosecutors and a few academics.  The last group  brought to Chicago 
specifically for trial skills training was part of what was called an Inter-American Clinic,  
funded by the international Labor Organization, to help locally-based human rights 
lawyers to litigate, party-fashion, in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 
Washington and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica. 
These 21 lawyers were from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Chiapas, Mexico.  
The principal distinguishing feature of this group is that each came to the program 
equipped with a real case file to litigate, looking to the project to teach them how to 
litigate.39
Subsequent trainings were conducted in the home country, either by design or 
because, after September 11, the participant visa issue became too onerous and it was 
determined that the several remaining programs should be conducted abroad.   One 
week or longer training sessions were held in Venezuela, for judges and public 
defenders, Guatemala, for professors and lawyers on the rules of evidence, Costa Rica, 
for attorneys planning to litigate in the Inter-American Court for Human Rights, and 
Hammergren, Judicial Training and Justice Reform, USAID, Rule of Law Series, Pub. No. PN-
ACD-021 (Washington, 1998).
39Presentation of cases between Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Right is largely handled by the Center for Justice and 
International Law (CEJIL), a non-governmental organization of lawyers specializing in practice 
before the Inter-American Court and the Commission.  CEJIL’s advocacy is often disconnected 
from the client community from which the particular case emanates.  An interesting corollary 
effect of this Inter-American clinic is that the lawyers are expected to return to their localities and 
to train their colleagues in oralidad, producing the so-called multiplier effect of the project. For 
further information on the CEJIL caseload, see http://www.cejil.org.
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Chiapas, Mexico for human rights lawyers.40
Methodology
The project objective started from the premise that countries in transition from 
the inquisitorial to the accusatorial model could learn from the structure and operation 
of the accusatory American trial.  In no way, however, was homogeneity the goal of the 
programs, particularly given the diversity of the Latin American legal systems.  The 
author approached the task with some misgivings since it is easier to admire the 
structure of the American system rather than its actual operation.  One concern was 
that the programs would teach habits unique to the American way of trying cases and 
not suitable for adaptation.  It was also of concern that the major weaknesses, some 
would say the essential dysfunction of the trial system (or at least the jury trial system) 
here would be patently obvious and lead to a wholesale rejection of what is probably a 
theoretically more desirable method– the party method.  Finally, it was also clear that 
those components of the European model that had become co-extensive with Latin  
American tradition would also be preserved.41 To recognize and accept those traditions, 
whether or not they made sense in the American system or even if their purpose in the 
national system (as described by the students) was unclear, would also be a frequent 
challenge.
Resolved never to defend the indefensible and committed to helping Latin 
40During this same time period, non-Latin American projects included programs in San 
Sebastian, Spain at the Institute of Criminology,  Pau, France at the law school, Genoa, Italy at
the law school, and two in Palestine, the first at two Palestinian law schools and later with the 
entire Palestinian judiciary, with sessions in both Ramallah and in Gaza.  
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lawyers make this important transition with a sensitivity to their local custom and 
practice made the work easier as our sessions usually included an acknowledgment of 
the pertinent weaknesses of American practice and its irrelevance to many of the local 
issues faced by participating lawyers.  Admitting the frailty of the notion of justice, that 
judges and juries everywhere can be biased, that there is sometimes a great distance 
between theory and practice and then sharing with the students a trial lawyer’s natural 
cynicism about due process and the system meant to support it was actually a bonding 
experience that enabled instructor and student  to communicate more frankly and 
directly.  
Communicating with the trial lawyers is a predictable issue.  As a long-time 
francophone and recent convert to Spanish, language proficiency was not a major 
barrier in Latin America, France, Spain, or the countries of North Africa.  In other 
countries, consecutive translation was always available.  Even with everyday fluency, a 
legal vocabulary is a separate vernacular requiring additional preparation.   
Another challenge was the manner in which the classes were to be conducted. 
Most of the skills training models in American law schools are unknown to Latin 
American lawyers.  Legal education, for the most part, consists of very large classes 
delivered in the lecture format.42  Seldom is there an opportunity for any student 
41Field and Fisher, supra, note 5, p. 49. 
42The University of Buenos Aires offers a typical example. It is a public institution with a 
policy of open access, with no entrance requirements or national graduation standards.  The 
student body numbers over 30,000 students. Dakolias, p. 19.   For a broad discussion of the state 
of legal education in Latin America, see generally Alfredo Fuentes-Hernandez, Globalization and 
Legal Education in Latin American: Issues for Law and Development in the 21st Century, 21 
Penn St. Int’l. L.Rev. 39 (2002).
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participation, much less any dialogue, Socratic or otherwise, between teacher and 
student.  Only recently have legal clinics begun to appear in Latin countries but, even 
then, the focus is seldom on litigation skills but rather on general client advocacy 
through letter writing, some investigation, accompaniment, etc.   This situation is 
complicated by the fact that, in Latin law schools, there is very little emphasis on the 
needs of practice or  procedural rules and virtually no instruction on oralidad.43  Most 
law students in Latin America are offered only very theoretical or historical courses 
which emphasize jurisprudential development to the detriment of application.44 Nor are
 there many specialty courses such as trial advocacy.  In fact, the Latin American 
lawyer never attended law school as Americans know it. What is called law school is 
merely a “major” (sometimes a major that excludes all other disciplines) that one 
chooses for the undergraduate years.  There is no post-graduate requirement and most 
law school professors are part-time due to the low salaries.45
The standard method for teaching trial advocacy in American law schools is the 
simulation/critique method.46  It was explained to the foreign attorneys that there would 
43Field and Fisher III, supra, note 5, p. 79 (commenting on the growing interest in Central 
American law schools in oralidad).
44See Hendrix, Steven E., Restructuring Legal Education in Guatemala: A model for law 
School Reform in Latin America, Journal of Legal Education, Vol 54, Dec. 2004.
45For a general discussion of the traditional mode of Latin legal education, see Joseph R. 
Thome, Heading South but Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in Latin America, 
2000 Wis.L.Rev. 691.  See also Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in 
Latin America, 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 167 (Fall, 1995)
46For an early seminal work on the simulation method, see Michael Meltsner and Philip 
G. Schrag, Towards Simulation in Legal Education: An Experimental Course in Pre-Trial 
Litigation (1975).  See also Thomas F. Geraghty, Foreword: Teaching Trial Advocacy in the 90s 
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be very little lecture and that our basic routine would be to have the students prepare 
and then present the assigned trial exercises.  After the presentation, there would be a 
critique and, time permitting, some discussion.  The discussions would often center on 
a subject completely unfamiliar to them, for example, the notion of a theory of the case 
and how to weave it into the examination.  In the selection of trial exercises, there was 
an emphasis placed on opening and closing statements, direct, cross and redirect 
examination.  There was less of an emphasis on motions practice or other legal 
argument on the theory that those advocacy skills would be more familiar to the 
participating students, most of whom had made legal argument in court.  A key part of 
the presentation was always a demonstration of how the particular exercise should be 
done.  That demonstration could, depending on the skill level of the group, be done 
before or after the student exercises on the particular trial skill in question.  Finding law 
students who spoke Spanish fluently enough to perform an opening or closing 
argument or a witness examination scripted by the author or to act as witnesses was 
not difficult.47 The instructor’s critique usually followed the recommended American 
pattern: usually no more than two points which draw specifically from what the student 
had said, no more than 3-4 minutes in length before moving on to the next student.  
Longer discussions, when necessary, were usually had at the end of the students’ 
performances.48
and Beyond, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 687 (1991).
47In other countries, such as Italy or Palestine, the instructor did the demonstration which 
was then translated consecutively, sentence by sentence.
48This teaching methodology is drawn principally from the “learn-by-doing” method 
initiated and fostered by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy.  See Teachers’ Manual for 
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Very little time was spent studying the recodification of procedure.  That inquiry 
was left to the individuals, many of whom had already gone through training programs 
on the substance and some of the implications of the new procedures.  Many had come 
to understand the daunting nature of learning the fundamentals of the party system. 49
Because they were accustomed only to “trial by affidavit,” they understood and 
accepted that  oralidad training would be the principal objective of the program.50
The decision was made to maximize the time each student spent in actual oral 
advocacy.  In advance of the beginning of the course, the students  were presented 
with normally three simulated case files fully translated into Spanish,51 complete with 
photos of real evidence, simulated police or accident reports, reports of experts, pretrial 
Problems and Cases in Criminal Trial Advocacy, National Institute for Trial Advocacy (2nd Ed. 
1989).
49In Guatemala, for example, the enactment, in July, 1994, of the Criminal Procedures 
Code required sweeping changes in the key legal sector institutions: the court system (Organismo 
Judicial), the Prosecutors Office and the Public Defenders Office.  Personnel from each of these 
institutions need to be trained in their individual and institutional roles under the new party 
system.  
50It should also be noted that considerably less time was spent on hearing procedures in 
civil cases.  On one hand, criminal systems have been the priority of most countries, given the 
backlogs in cases and onerously long pretrial detention.  Recodification of the law of civil 
procedure has, therefore, proceeded at a much slower pace than the criminal counterpart.  The 
Civil Procedure Code of Costa Rica took effect in 1998 but has been very slow to implement.  In 
Uruguay, where the Civil Code reform was accompanied by a tripling in the number of available 
and trained judges, the results have been much different. There is a model civil procedure code 
available to reform projects: the Model Ibero-American Code of Procedure.   See Martha Field 
and William Fisher III, supra, note 5, at p. 32,40, 71.
51When translation is necessary, the case files have to be forwarded well in advance of the 
program.  The Spanish translation was not always difficult, given the number of law students or 
cooperating Latin law professors  who could either do or arrange to have  the translating done.  
The problem was more severe in Palestine where the issue of translation into Arabic was more 
difficult.
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statements. depositions, and the like.  The simulated files distributed were much like 
the standard case files used in the trial advocacy course.52  Also distributed was an 
overview of the basic trial schematic explaining the order of the presentation of the 
opposing cases.  In some cases, translated descriptive summaries giving an overview 
of the trial system, a description of the basic evidentiary objections, and a listing of 
possible pretrial motions were also handed out.
The instructor’s preparation, in addition to a thorough understanding of the case 
files assigned and adequate training in the critique method,  included a review of the 
recent codifications of the participating countries.  That might include the new code of 
criminal procedure or legislation mandating a transition to the party system or 
modifications of the traditional system.  The task is easier when one is seeking only to 
highlight differences in procedure.  Since most Latin American countries are “code” 
countries and case precedent plays much less a role than in this country, there was 
seldom any case law to review.  
The course’s first session was usually devoted to an explanation of the trial 
phase  and an abbreviated look at U.S. pretrial civil or criminal procedure.  Those 
overviews were presented in a discussion format to draw out the differences and clarify 
several of the U.S. idiosyncracies, sometimes with computer graphics or handouts to 
help students visualize the problems.  Each lawyer was then assigned to a party in one 
of the cases, instructed to review the entire file, and to be prepared to present whatever 
exercise was scheduled for the next class.  Once assigned to a particular party, the 
52See, e.g., Thomas A. Mauet and Warren D. Wolfson, Materials in Trial Advocacy: 
Problems and Cases, 5th Ed. (2002).
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student would advocate that party’s interest for all of the exercises.  Should there be 
time in the program to repeat the exercises, students would then be assigned to 
represent a different party in a different case.  It was recommended that the participants 
work in small groups to better understand the file and to develop a theory of the case.   
It was also recommended that the students conduct small group oral “rehearsals” of the 
exercises.   That particular recommendation was less likely to be followed unless 
student program assistants actually scheduled practice sessions.  
At each class session, a prosecutor and defender or plaintiff and defendant from 
each of the “teams” assigned to a particular case would be designated to begin a series 
of repetitions of the assignment for each of the several case studies. One student in the 
group would perform, “opposing counsel” would be making objections and waiting to do 
the cross-examination or the responsive argument and other group members  would 
observe, role-play the witness, or sit as the judge.  The judge role-play was more 
valuable than the witness role-play as it gave the attorneys an opportunity to feel first-
hand the frustration of the judge transitioning to the party model.  If resources are 
available, outsiders are better suited to act as witnesses, simulating the equivocation, 
inconsistency and lack of articulation of a typical trial witness. The instructor’s role, as it 
is in law school trial advocacy, was to observe but not to stop the exercise for any 
reason until ready for the critique.  The students were told that they should attempt to 
resolve their own difficulties by staying in role and that conflicts were to be decided by 
the judge.  Perhaps surprisingly, very few students had “breakdowns” in the middle of 
an exercise.  
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In the witness examination exercises, the students were to present direct, cross 
and redirect even though there is no provision in most Latin American procedural 
codes, even the new ones, for redirect.  We did not conduct a simulated rebuttal case 
for the state or plaintiffs, again departing from actual practice but following the standard 
trial advocacy format.  As a matter of the instructor’s preference, two students would 
perform an exercise representing the opposing parties before each critique.  Though
the critique would not occur until there had been two performances, the critique itself 
was individualized.  Exercises were limited in time so that each student assigned in a 
class ranging from 10-15 people could perform at least once per 2 or 2 1/2 hour class 
session.  This posed a problem for these experienced lawyers who, if nothing else, 
were accustomed to making long speeches and then justifying themselves latter during 
the critique.  It was often necessary for the instructor to cut short an examination or 
argument that was rambling.
At the conclusion of the course, it would be ideal  to conduct an entire mock trial  
but time was truly of the essence in all but the first of these programs.  That first 
program, three months in length, was luxuriously arranged so as to not only allow for 
full final mock trials, but also allow actual visits to civil and criminal trials and to dialogue 
with Hispanic judges and lawyers about the trial system.  At the very least, time should 
be left to conduct an evaluation of the program and to give each of the students more 
personal, detailed feedback than can be done in the classroom atmosphere.
Nature of the Resistance
The mistakes made by the program lawyers very substantially mirrored the 
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mistakes that American law students are prone to make.  To mention a few at the 
outset, it was very infrequent that arguments or witness examinations reflected a 
coherent theory of the case; the basic rules of cross-examination were violated with 
impunity, with particular note of the participants’ insistence on asking open-ended 
questions on cross-examination; not understanding the importance of constructing a 
narrative so the trier of fact has the impression of being told a story (what American 
lawyers would call a jury-centered approach) or even the importance of artful 
presentational or rhetorical skills in general, many of the students would persist in 
reading their prepared scripts or using cross-examination as a fishing expedition where 
distracting and useless arguments with the witness were inevitable.  
Normally, the judges showed an over-eagerness to speak and interrupt in court.  
Presumably, that was because there were accustomed to running the courtroom in their 
national systems.  The practicing attorneys, whether prosecutors, defense lawyers or 
private practitioners, were often, at the outset,  timid and reluctant.  One of the many 
satisfactions with teaching this type of program is that, with time and practice, the 
lawyers relax, begin to find their “voice” in the courtroom. They become more engaged 
not only in understanding the orthodox techniques but also in developing their own 
sense of their personality in the  courtroom.  Opening and closing arguments were the 
easiest for the lawyers to simulate because of the similarity with legal argument.
The participants found it difficult to accept several of the fundamentals of the 
American trial system.  Though there is no single component of our system that met 
with unanimous disapproval, it is possible to segregate out a number of the aspects of 
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the party trial system that met with the most resistance.  
A)  The jury system.  Of the many unusual reactions, perhaps the most 
unanticipated was the almost complete rejection of the jury system.53  The most 
common observation was that cases must be tried by “competent” people, trained in the 
law, and commanding of respect.  A jury chosen at random from the citizenry would 
simply not be intelligent or learned enough to resolve complicated factual issues and 
would, therefore, operate to denigrate the whole system.  The assurance that the jury 
would be instructed in the law and that their main job was to decide the contested facts 
as highlighted by the lawyers for both sides was of little consolation.  Even lawyers from 
the most corrupt legal systems, where few judges would dream of contradicting the 
police or military authorities, and where one would think a randomly-selected jury would 
offer the best chance of an honest, unbiased result, even they were quick to condemn 
leaving so heavy a social responsibility on the shoulders of the average citizen.  The 
most left-leaning of the lawyers, whom I had expected to side with the democracy-
building tactic of letting the people decide important issues which affect the social fabric 
such as criminal conduct ,  argued that, ideally, members of the community should sit in 
judgement of each other but that the whole notion was contrary to their tradition and 
culture and that their countries were not yet ready for the citizen jury.  
Given the high rates of illiteracy in so many Latin countries and the repressive 
state apparatus that would intimidate many jurors into coming to a government-desired 
result, it shouldn’t be completely surprising that even habitually anti-government lawyers 
would think they had a better chance with a judge than with a jury.  There was also the 
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perception, not altogether unreasonable, that, with juries, the premium on charlatanism 
by the trial lawyers would increase and performance, rather than the facts or a sense of 
justice, would dictate the outcome.   They were not surprised to hear of the very low 
rates of actual juries in this country.54 Their conclusion from the data was that American 
lawyers also shared their distrust of juries.  Although that is sometimes the case, the
primary reason for the low rate of juries in this country is the time and expense burden 
that juries place on an already over-loaded trial calendar in this, the most litigious of all 
countries.55
B)  The suggestibility of cross-examination. Cross-examination posed any 
number of both principled and pragmatic objections.  The most common complaint was 
that, because leading questions are suggestive, the fairness of the proceeding is 
compromised.  Lawyers given the normal latitude on cross were seen as exercising too 
much control over the witness and putting words into the witness’ mouth.  Indeed, 
substantial time was spent instructing students on the phrasing of questions so as to 
elicit one word responses as well as the development of the ability to cut off a witness 
who wishes to respond beyond the narrow parameters of the closed-ended question 
53None of the revised codes have, so far, recommended the adoption of the jury system.
54Of the 98,786 tort cases that were terminated in U.S. District courts during fiscal years 
2202 and 2003, 1,647 or 2% were decided by a bench or jury trial.  Over 95% of all criminal 
cases are terminated by guilty pleas and fewer than 5% go to bench or jury trial.  U.S.Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2002.  See 
generally, Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J.Empirical Leg.Studies 459 (2004)
55See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the 
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 Duke L.J. 447, 456 (2004)(arguing that, in fact, Americans 
are not the most litigious of all people but rather that Americans tend more than any other 
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that was asked.  It was also recommended, consistent with basic trial teaching 
orthodoxy, that the cross-examiner avoid asking any question to which he/she did not 
already know the answer and that certain areas of the direct testimony should just be 
avoided on cross where there was nothing to gain.56
The notion that the cross-examiner would not review all of the testimony given on 
direct or that the lawyer would simply direct the witness’ testimony to a few areas of 
weakness was foreign to most of them.  As a result, there were many questions to the 
effect of “were you sure when you said on direct...” or “is it possible that you were 
mistaken when you said....”  Coupled with the idea that a witness on cross-examination 
should not be allowed to give any extended answers, and that, in reality, it is the lawyer 
who is testifying by virtue of the weave of the questions, and, finally, that the witness on 
cross is merely confirming what the lawyer is actually stating (albeit in question form), 
the overall impression taken away by program participants was often that cross-
examination seemed over-bearing and oppressive.  In addition to those observations, 
many of the students also felt that witnesses in their countries would not have the 
temerity to stand their ground during an aggressive cross-examination and that a lot of 
“badgering” objections would be necessary.  
C)  The duty to investigate.  The American lawyer is accustomed to accepting 
the duty to the client to begin the investigation and preparation for trial virtually at the 
moment of accepting the case.  The project participants often found it difficult to accept 
nationality to use litigation to solve social problems). 
56Thomas A. Mauet, Trials: Strategy, Skills, and the New Powers of Persuasion, (Aspen, 
2005, Ch. 6.4, p. 217
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that they should do an investigation independent of the police and prosecutorial 
authorities.  They were taken aback when told that the party model demanded that 
each lawyer sift through the evidence, and then decide which evidence their client 
should present and which evidence is likely to be presented by the opponent.   
Moreover, the suggestion that the defense (in criminal cases) would race the 
prosecution to get statements from the witnesses was antithetical to their notion that the 
defense is not even activated until the investigation is complete, an arrest has been 
made and the prosecution has made a formal recommendation.  Under the old model, 
the judge supervised the continuing investigation while the parties watched.  Under the 
new systems, it is not specified in the codes exactly what procedures are to be followed 
and when those procedures are activated but it seemed the consensus that the duty to 
investigate transfers from the judge to the prosecution.  In some countries, it seemed 
clear that the prosecution would supervise police activity.  In others, the prosecution is 
left to review police evidence or to conduct a separate investigation. These provisions 
are unclear or nonexistent in most of the new codes but the participating attorneys were 
confident that the main effect of the transition would be to place investigation squarely 
under the jurisdiction of the prosecution in criminal cases.57
The notion of becoming familiar with the opponent’s case if for no other reason 
57See Sarles, footnote 11, supra.  In the Italian conversion, one of the first transition to the 
accusatorial model amongst European countries, it evolved that the judge was gradually removed 
from any role in the gathering of evidence, other than to issue arrest, search or wiretapping 
warrants and overseeing the course of discovery.  The prosecutor was thus left with almost 
unlimited powers in the crucial steps of preliminary investigation, thus breaking the traditional 
balance of power between the judge and prosecutor and leading many judges to feel like little 
more than a “notary.” See Ennio Amodio, supra, note 21, p. 491-493.
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than to be able to conduct a reasonable cross-examination was equally unfamiliar. If 
the prosecutor had already interviewed the witnesses and the police, there was no 
reason, argued the students, to conduct any separate defense interviews until the time 
of trial.
 Even the criminal defense lawyers were reticent to doubt the credibility of the 
state’s investigation or to agree that an in-depth challenge to all state evidence where 
possible is part of the professional duty.  Because all agreed that the police would do 
little or nothing to flesh out the defense, the lawyers were more comfortable with the 
idea of simply developing a defense case, independent of the prosecution, and letting 
the prosecution put its case together without interference or even participation by the 
defense.  Neither the criminal nor the civil lawyers had ever heard of the analogy 
between trial lawyers and architects: that both sides have the same raw materials but 
each side will build a different building.  The tendency, rather, was to accept the 
building as presented by the plaintiff/prosecutor, to avoid attacking the edifice and 
merely to construct a defense which relied mainly on saying that the opposing case 
lacked credibility.  
The prevailing legal culture in most Latin countries that the police or other paid 
investigators of the government do the investigating and that the lawyers have no role 
independent of those investigations poses serious issues for the future success of the 
party model in Latin America.  In fact, criminal investigation is one of the most serious 
and neglected problems in most underdeveloped systems, with police having no access 
to forensic methods, relying primarily on witness statements58 and the confession.59
58O’Shaughnessy and Dodson, supra, note 25,  p. 11
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The use of sophisticated and expensive investigatory techniques is just beginning and 
only in those countries willing to spend resources on the justice system and law 
enforcement.  In some places, scientific and technical experts are beginning to be used 
in the justice system.  To the participants, however, the idea that a lawyer could 
investigate complicated scientific matters and then effectively compete on cross-
examination with a doctor, forensic specialist or other kind of expert was completely 
unknown to them.  
D)  The role of the judge.  The role of the judge changes most dramatically in 
the changeover to the party system.  The groups of judges in these programs found 
their new roles most unacceptable even though, under the new system, they retain the 
ultimate power of final decision at the trial level.  They were very accustomed to being 
in charge of most aspects of the proceedings: calling whichever witnesses they wanted, 
in the order they chose, and then asking all or most of the questions.  For a judge to be 
“reduced” to the role of referee, merely ruling on objections or legal points, seen but not 
heard until there is a problem, was perhaps too shocking for them to absorb in the few 
short weeks of the programs.  Time and again, the simulations were derailed by a 
“judge” (whether in role or really a judge) who wanted to find out immediately whatever 
it was he or she wanted to know and was not willing to let the examinations take their 
course.  In that situation, the judge would either insist on questioning, arguing with the 
lawyers, introducing into evidence items that neither counsel had submitted, or simply 
commenting very prematurely on credibility.    It was common, for example,  for a role-
59Yamin and Noriega Garcia, supra, note 26, p. 31 (The Role of the Judiciary in the 
Perpetuation of Torture)
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playing participant to rule on an objection or motion with commentary to the effect that 
he/she simply didn’t believe the testimony.  Whenever there was an objection, 
particularly a relevancy objection, the judges were likely to assess both the legal 
aspects and the credibility of the witness, or just simply offer their own opinion of what 
the witness was or was not saying.  Since the jury system appears to one of the less 
feasible transplants to Latin systems, the judge (and any associate “assessors” or 
panels of judges as exist in some systems)60 will remain the final determiners of 
credibility and, as such, will retain the ultimate decision-making power.  Because judges 
are on a separate professional career track and because they are often the products of 
judicial-training institutions,61 it should be feasible to convince at least the next 
generation of the judiciary that the need in the transition is to adapt to a different but not
inferior role.
One side effect of this problem of hyper-active judges was a high occurrence of 
argument among counsel and the bench.  Rather than focus on the jury or on the flow 
of the case and the importance of telling a story, counsel very quickly would get 
engaged in heated debate or “legal” argument that could easily have been avoided or 
simply wasn’t worth the disruption.  In the author’s experience, this is also typical of 
U.S. students.  
E)  Plea-bargaining.  The debate over plea-bargaining was never-ending.  In 
most Latin systems, a trial is eventually held in every case that isn’t dismissed during 
60See e.g., the Criminal Procedures Code of Honduras, effective February, 2002, under 
which the oral, accusatorial system is to replace the written, inquisitorial system.  Trials will be 
presided over by three judges, one at each state of the trial.
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the investigation phase .  That trial, however, may seem more like a guilty plea in that 
the judge will often review the written summarized evidence, not call any witnesses (the 
defendant in the criminal case is the most common witness), and restrict the lawyers to 
arguing matters pertaining to sentencing.  A resolution of the matter pre-trial by 
conference between the attorneys, with or without the judge, was previously unknown, 
although there are now signs of change in a number of national systems that have 
converted to the party model.62  Under the old model, there are not two parties between 
whom there can be a negotiation and agreement.  There is no tradition of compromising 
on the charge or on the facts of the case since the official duty is the discovery of the 
“truth,” meaning in this context that, even if the defendant admits guilt, the process goes 
on through a formal “trial” so as to properly apply the law to the facts and then to decide 
the sentence.63   There is no recognition that the defense lawyer is an equal partner to 
the proceedings along with the judge and the “official” prosecutor.  Even should there 
be some sort of agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant, there is, in the 
inquisitorial model, no provision that the judge should even hear of such a compromise 
much less be bound by it.  
The students came quickly to the understanding that, without plea-bargaining, 
the American system would collapse under its own weight. When they heard that in 
excess of 90% of all our cases are decided by guilty plea or by settlement, our avowed 
61Field and FisherIII, supra, note 5, p. 53.
62Ennio Amodio, supra, note 21, p. 491.  See also, Jonathan L. Hafetz, supra, note 2.
63Steven E. Hendrix, supra, note 29, p. 390.
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dedication to the jury system resonated less.64  Several practical aspects of the guilty 
plea process struck many participants as clear violations of human rights.  For example, 
it is common practice in the United States that, in exchange for a guilty plea, an indicted 
charge will be reduced.  In some jurisdictions, depending on the local legal culture, the 
prosecutor may even threaten that, if the defendant chooses not to plead guilty, a new 
indictment can be sought which would, in fact, increase the severity of the charges to 
be faced.65  That sort of a threat was seen as coercive to many participants and a threat 
to due process.  Another practice that seemed anathema to them is the procedure 
sanctioned by the so-called Alford66 plea, whereby a not-guilty person could 
nonetheless plead guilty to simply get out of pretrial incarceration and dispose of the 
charges.  Many participants argued that the Alford plea is completely violative of every 
due process sense they had and renders the right to trial and the right to jury trial 
illusory.  Finally, the idea that a prosecutor would over-charge a defendant to have 
more leeway in plea bargaining was also generally seen as unethical and anti-
64Greg Berman, Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of 
Justice, 41 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 1313, 1317 (2004).
65Bodenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).  For a complete discussion of the 
implications of Bodenkircher, see William J. Stuntz, Bodenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea 
Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, Harvard Public Law Working Paper 120, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=854284.
66North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 168.  Because the likelihood of 
conviction is high and the sanctions potentially severe, a defense lawyer may recommend a 
negotiated guilty plea even where the defendant maintains his/her innocence, as long as there is a 
“strong factual basis for the plea.” This procedure is used by defendants against whom the weight
of the evidence is heavy, in spite of their innocence.  They choose to minimize their exposure to 
the longer prison sentence should the trier of fact choose to believe the state’s case.  The Alford
plea is also used by defendant incarcerated pretrial who plead innocence but who eventually 
plead guilty if the sentence offered is probation and they can be released. 
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defendant.67
F)  Theory and theme of the case.  For a number of reasons, the lawyers 
exhibited very limited capacity to develop a theory of the case68 and even less 
willingness to see that task as key in a system focused on a credible narrative of 
events.   In both argument and witness examination, they would project inconsistent or 
highly speculative defenses or spend large amounts of time and effort solidifying a key  
point of the opponent as a side effect of having pounced on  a clearly collateral 
inconsistency. The notion that a party must be able to explain their case in a short two-
sentence summation was widely resisted.  Though the development of a theme69 to use 
in opening statements and closing arguments  was more popular and seen by the 
67Note that, in various European countries, the notion of plea-bargaining has taken hold, 
albeit with important differences from the U.S. system.  Nonetheless, one commentator see plea-
bargaining as the “Trojan horse” of the adversarial system. See Maximo Langer, From Legal 
Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 1,35 (2004).  In Latin 
America, there are examples in criminal procedure where there may be a “consensual” 
termination to the proceeding.  For those provisions in Guatemala, see Alberto Bovino, Temas de 
Derecho Procesal Penal Guatemalteco 141-164 (1996).  In Costa Rica, see COD.PROC. PEN, 
arts. 373-375.  In Argentina, under the terms of the procedimiento abreviado, a prosecutor and 
defense lawyer can agree as to a sentence if not greater than six years of imprisonment and 
conditioned on the defendant’s full admission to the indictment.  The trial court may still 
disagree and acquit but may not sentence the defendant to longer than the agreed-upon term.  
COD.PROC>PEN. Arti. 431 bis 1-5.
68The expression “theory of the case” is used here to describe that set of facts which, 
when combined, allows the advocate to tell the fact-finder a coherent and consistent story.  As 
Mauet puts it, is is “simply a logical, persuasive story of ‘what really happened....’ your theory of 
the case must combine your undisputed evidence and your version of the disputed evidence that 
you will present in storytelling form at trial.” Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques (6th Ed. 2002), 
p. 507.
69By theme, trial lawyers usually mean a short leit motif or refrain that summarizes the 
theory and can be repeated often enough so as to impose itself on the consciousness of the fact-
finder.  Mauet, Id. at 509
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participants as perhaps an amusing rhetorical device, there was a general conclusion 
that a theme would not be usable before a judicial panel trier of fact in Latin America.
 As to the theory and theme of the case, it is clear that the nature of legal 
argument in Latin countries is to paint with a broad brushstroke.  The students, whether 
judges or simply lawyers, had very little eye for the kind of minute detail which, when 
exploited, can distinguish a guilty from a non-guilty, liability from non-liability.  
G) The Presentation of “Novel” Types of Evidence.  Least surprising of all was 
the students’ reluctance to see video and computer evidence or other types of 
demonstrative tools as useful or likely to be used in the presentation of the case.  The 
threshold issue is, of course, the resources to assemble these testimonial aids.  It was 
not difficult for the participants, whether they worked in under-funded prosecution or 
defense office or on their own in a small office, to predict that many years will pass 
before the technology of the American courtroom appears in Latin America.70  Beyond 
the resources issue, it was feared that some of the newer types of evidence would 
deceive the trier of fact and therefore be prejudicial.  There was widespread distrust of 
computerized evidence, such as accident reconstructions,71 With some degree of 
indignation, one student said that computers should never be allowed to replace people 
which, ultimately, is perhaps the direction of U.S. litigation.  The reluctance did not 
apply to forensic evidence, maps or charts, photographs or video interviews.  Since it 
70That may certainly be true in the criminal system where most defendants are indigent 
and public budgets are minimal.  Power-point presentations, for example, have already begun to 
appear in business-related litigation in some parts of Latin America.  
71For a broad description of the technology and the costs, see generally, Report of the 
Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, Legal Development: Report 
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appears that there is very little precedent for using even the most common types of 
demonstratives in Latin cases, the discussion often centered on issues of admissibility 
and, in general, convincing the judge to allow the evidence to be used.
One likely explanation for the hesitation to see technology in the courtroom as an 
important advance is perhaps the fact that trial lawyers in Latin America (and 
elsewhere) have not traditionally had the latitude in the presentation of evidence that 
has been enjoyed by American lawyers.  Given the procedural strait-jacket of the 
inquisitorial model and its restrictions on the role of the lawyers, Latin American 
attorneys may feel that they will not be allowed to present newer forms of evidence, 
demonstrative or otherwise, in courtrooms where judges are accustomed to trial by 
affidavit. All agreed that the party attorney would need to request permission of the 
judge to introduce a new form of evidence, whereas the U.S. trial lawyer can more 
confident that a foundation of reliability can be laid.
Future
Fairness to the litigants is what should be at the heart of the changes now 
sweeping through Latin American trial systems.  In a hitherto closed and inaccessible 
process, the real parties in interest are often left with a sense of lack of due process, a 
sense that they have not received their “day in court.”  Indeed, they have not in that 
they had very little control over the investigation, presentation, or analysis of the case.  
The change to the party system lets the litigants (with the assistance of counsel) 
become a more integral part of the proceedings.  The trial phase should show the most 
dramatic transformation, with the counsel for the litigants now in charge of the 
on Cost-Effrective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 Alb.L.Rev. 263 (1995)
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presentation of the case, with the broadening of live witness testimony, the 
confrontation inherent to cross-examination, and the right to present the evidence, 
including evidence in its newer forms, according to the trial plan of the party.  
The oral hearing model should also encourage judges to not only be more 
efficient but also more open and transparent in how they decide and in how they
manage the proceedings.  The dynamic of the trial process should also change 
dramatically.  When there are open hearings where the parties are actually present and 
offering testimony, where lawyers and judges are interacting not only over procedure 
but also over the evidence, the  primera instancia, will seem much more about real 
problems involving real people, rather than a stack of written materials to be waded 
through, summarized, and digested.72
American lawyers are comfortable with having the lawyers develop and present 
the evidence favorable to the client and letting the opponent do the same.  We recoil at 
the notion that the judge would be the primary actor, calling the witnesses, controlling 
the presentation of evidence, and commenting on the strength of the case as the trial 
unfolds. Particularly in countries where the neutrality or integrity of the judiciary is 
suspect, oralidad and the requirement that the case be decided on the evidence 
presented by the parties rather than the evidence reviewed by the judge in some closed 
proceeding seems a step forward in inducing judicial accountability for decisions.  
Forced to make decisions based upon a record that was available for all to see in a 
public trial will render the legal system more accessible and democratic.
The transition will also improve the quality of the trial bar and strengthen the 
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ability of lawyers to be truly effective advocates.  The ability to investigate and have 
access to the evidence will encourage a much more proactive version of lawyering, 
empowering attorneys to get fully involved in the case at a much earlier stage and to 
therefore reliably predict to their clients what the evidence will be at trial and the 
prospects for success.  It will also help lawyers to develop the eye for detail and 
contradiction that is not taught in Latin American law schools and cannot be developed 
without an opportunity to truly challenge the evidence.
Oralidad will create a whole new subclass of attorneys known for their courtroom 
brilliance, their ability to creatively present a case and to attack the case against them.  
More importantly, any lawyer trained in the party system should eventually feel the 
interest of the client, rich or poor, powerful or powerless, can be leveraged onto an even 
playing field where the primary focus of the case, by virtue of the attorney’s ability to 
examine, cross-examine, and argue, will be on the rights of all the parties, not just those 
favored by the judge.
         One can only hope that once the reins of management of the case are loosened 
from the grip of the trial judge, that the opposing parties, in the spirit of civil but hard-
fought combat, will take the proceedings much more into the realm of the everyday and 
trials and court hearings will become more accessible to the understanding of the non-
lawyer.  Judges, as the ultimate decision-makers, should not see their management 
roles as diminished but rather redirected.  The demystification of the trial process 
should be an integral component in maximizing the impetus to use the courts. 
The purpose of this article has been to anticipate some of the problems that will 
72See discussion, Martha Field and Willilam W. Fisher III, supra, note 5 at p. 24.
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be brought on by the change in trial systems.  Those changes will engender a new set 
of problems about  which trial lawyers will soon be making demands for change.  One 
of those problem areas concerns rules of evidence. The author has participated in two 
projects to develop rules of evidence and discovery, it having become obvious that trial 
procedures alone were not sufficient to complete the transition.  The need for rules of 
evidence should be clear.  There are quite simply no well-accepted rules that govern 
the admissibility of evidence, including even generally agreed-upon concepts of 
relevance.  For example, the trial lawyers and the judges in the programs, whether real  
or in-role, would quickly seek to introduce the criminal defendant’s character or past 
encounters with the law, regardless of when they occurred, their seriousness, whether 
they resulted in a conviction, or whether the defendant had testified.73  For another, 
hearsay was occasionally objected to but on a relevance basis.  It was surprising to 
learn that the Spanish word for hearsay74 is not commonly used in Latin courts and that 
there is no general rule for admissibility of hearsay, much less for exceptions.  As a 
third example, judges will commonly dismiss witnesses as incompetent on any number 
and variety of grounds such as children under sixteen, persons with disabilities such as 
blindness, all extended family relatives, and the like.75
Some of this lack of uniformity of practice is understandable, given that many of 
the federal and state rules of evidence in the U.S. are predicated on a need to protect 
juries from prejudicial or irrelevant information.  In a system where juries are unknown 
73See Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) and (2).
74De oídas or, alternatively, pruebas de referencia
75Martha Field and William W. Fisher III, supra, note 5, p. 27
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but where judges are assumed, as in the rest of the world, to be fair and impartial, there 
is theoretically less need to filter the evidence since a judge is less likely to be 
prejudiced and more likely to give the evidence the weight it deserves. It is also 
probably true that, as more than one participant observed, we have overly complicated 
questions of admissibility to the point where there is little internal coherence to our 
theory that juries are competent on some matters and not so competent on others.  
Nonetheless, even in a system where the judge and assessors or rapporteurs are the 
final decision-makers, there is a need for uniformity of practice on the admissibility of 
evidence. There have been a few initiatives toward codifications of evidence rules in 
Latin America that are, as yet, incipient.76
Equally clear is the need for more comprehensive rules of discovery.  There are 
precious few discovery devices available to attorneys in either the pretrial or trial 
phases.  Copies of the complaint and statement of the defendant are commonly 
available but there is normally no provision for access to scientific evidence, statements 
of witnesses, interrogatories, depositions, and the like.77  One concern, of course, would 
be that new rules of discovery could be used to impede and delay the trial process, 
much as occurs in the United States when the discovery process is abused.  Another 
concern is that any inequality between the parties could be exploited during discovery, 
disadvantaging the party with fewer resources. 
76Most projects in this regard are at the conference stage. For example, the author was 
privileged to participate in the First Congress for Jurists and University Professors on the Law of 
Evidence, held in Guatemala City in 1997.
77See Martha A. Field and William W.Fisher, III, Legal Reform in Central America,  
“Necessary Civil Procedure Reforms within Either Traditional or Hearing-Based systems, ch.4
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If one can generalize in this evolving situation, it seems clear that, with the party 
system, there are effects beyond the orality, the reduced role of the judge, and the 
increased role of the lawyers as architects of the cases presented.  When lawyers can 
take a much more aggressive role on behalf of their clients, even if cases do not come 
to trial more quickly,78 the trials themselves take place much more quickly and therefore 
are more focused on the key points.79  When witnesses are actually called and 
examinations conducted, the trial becomes more transparent than it was when the 
review of affidavits was the key judicial function. 
Obviously, the greatest variable in assessing the potential for success of the 
changeover to the party system is the political climate in each country.  As elsewhere, 
the passing of a new procedure code or even new rules of evidence and discovery does 
little to achieve real reform in dysfunctional or corrupt legal systems.  From the apex of 
government structure to the lowest level of political and legal organization, the political 
will to change as part of the democratization process must be manifested in more than 
just words.  The feedback  received from the former students informs that many judges 
have refused to changeover or that they merely give lip service to the new models.
 Corruption is, of course, another problem that cuts across all procedural models 
throughout the world, threatening to undermine any reform project. Given the 
widespread perception of the legal system as corrupt and the few resources expended 
78It appears that, under the accusatorial system, cases are getting to the trial courtroom in 
much shorter time which has the obvious advantage that, in criminal cases, presumed innocent 
defendants are spending much less time incarcerated prior to trial.  See Peter J. Messitte, 
Expanding the Rule of Law: Judicial Reform in Central Europe & Latin America, 4 Wash. U. 
Global Studies L.Rev. 617, 618 (2005) (quoting Steven Hendrix).
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in most Latin countries on public education, it will be difficult to combat the public 
perception of judicial corruption,  unfairness, and lack of independence.     With 
continued ethics training at judicial and prosecutorial schools, with appointment of 
judges regardless of political connections, with heightened visibility through media and 
technology of the conduct of trials, with strong disciplinary actions against the corrupt, 
and with the ability of lawyers to protest in open court any perceived bias of the bench, 
there is at least the potential for reform.  
The prospects for a short-term changeover period with rapid implementation of 
the new procedures are not good.  At issue is not only the procedural and statutory 
reform but also a complete overhaul of the culture of the courtroom and the role of 
lawyers.  Attempting to train present judges and lawyers will have some usefulness in 
the transformation but, on the whole, the best prospects for the legal reform movement 
lie within the law schools.  The  training of  the professors and the revision of  the 
curriculum are key components in assessing the long-term prospects for the transition. 
If law professors can be persuaded to teach practice as well as theory and if the course 
offerings, both substantively and methodologically, can be modified to reflect the needs 
of the practitioner, then the next generation will learn not only the doctrinal law of the 
party system, both substantively and procedurally, but also the practice skills that are 
needed to implement that system.  
As deficient as the U.S. system may be in so many practical ways, the North 
American model represents probably the best structural framework of the party system.  
Even if it weren’t, Latin American countries would be tempted to emulate the U.S. legal 
79Id. at 618.
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infrastructure and procedures simply because globalization has made the U.S. a 
reference point for most legal and economic initiatives.  U.S. government resources 
spent on legal reform in Latin America are well-spent, not only because the result is 
more American-friendly but also because the people of the region are well-served.  
USAID and other international organizations in which the U.S. plays a major role such 
as the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
World Bank should consider expanding their efforts help these reforms sift to the base 
of each individual Latin country involved in the transition.  
